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b. With the establishment of the paramilitary police in the summer of 1948, within the framework and under the cover of the ordinary police, the Soviet Zone authorities commenced their endeavors to create a cadre for the

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so-called "People's Army". This development should not be misconstrued to be a result of the increased tension in international relations. On the contrary, the establishment of the paramilitary police represented a tactical move on part of the Bolsheviks, a move which had been prepared well in advance.

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selection of personnel for the paramilitary police and the "People's Army" commenced in the last years of the war, in special camps in the USSR, at a time when there was hardly any indication of heightened tension in post-war world politics.

(Comment: Discussions on Free Germany Committee matters and on the appointment of former German officers to leading positions in the Soviet Zone government are omitted from this summary.)

- c. The legal aspects of the police development in the Soviet Zone appear to be sufficiently well-known through articles in the daily press

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II. The military character of the so-called People's Police

1. Recruiting Methods

- a. A considerable part of the so-called People's Police consists of volunteers. One must be objective enough to admit that these volunteers are mostly young people, who, in view of the economic development of the Soviet Zone, find themselves without hope for advancement in their chosen occupations or who, for other reasons, face economic difficulties. Naturally, in addition to these "unwilling volunteers", there has been a constant drive to recruit the maximum possible number of loyal SED members into the ranks of the police, to secure from the beginning the basic political reliability of the newly organized structure.
- b. The great importance of the police in the Soviet Zone became noticeable as early as 1946, i.e. at a time when the East-West tension did not yet exist in its present form, and when there was no talk yet in the Soviet propaganda organs of "danger to peace" and "splitting of Germany". At that time the Soviet Zone police organs were divorced from municipal responsibility and were subordinated directly to the Interior Ministers of the Länder. Although in theory the Bürgermeister of the municipality remained the "chief" of the local police force, in practice this was merely a farce. As early as 1946 the political considerations were decisive in the appointment of candidates for the police forces in the Soviet Zone. Only SED members were appointed and members of other parties were systematically discharged. Since political reliability and not professional experience or qualification became the deciding factor, the quality of the Soviet Zone police deteriorated rapidly. Arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, inhuman interrogation methods, failure to notify relatives, etc. were the order of the day, and newspaper readers will remember the reputation which the Soviet Zone police soon gained. Representatives of the CDU and the LDP in the Länder Assemblies have attempted repeatedly to make the conditions prevailing in the police forces a subject of parliamentary inquiry. Any suggestion that the functioning of the Interior Ministry was not subject to

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parliamentary control. Later, by an order of the SIA, debate on police problems in the Lander Assemblies was prohibited. The establishment of the German Administration of the Interior, its special position under the German Economic Commission, and finally the appointment of Kurt Fischer, former Saxony Interior Minister, formed the logical conclusion of a trend which exempted the police structure from every kind of parliamentary or other public control. The purpose of this exemption was, among other things, to prevent criticism of recruiting methods, and to eliminate the possibility that the so-called "black parties" might gain a proportionate influence in the personnel policies of the police. Once assumed, the arbitrary and unilateral SED control of personnel policies has never been relinquished.

- c. It was anticipated by the Russians that when the time arrived for a large-scale expansion of the police apparatus, the ranks could no longer be filled with volunteers. The existence of enough young men who could be considered "politically reliable" was also considered problematical. Therefore the method of so-called "forced volunteering" was adopted. Since the expanded police force was to have a military rather than civilian character, the simplest method of recruitment was from among the prisoners of war still in the USSR. Selected from among the physically fit POW's, the candidates were brought together in groups of about 100. After a period of lectures and detailed interrogation they were called upon to sign a simple statement in which they applied for admission in the "Volkspolizei" following release from captivity. Since it was intimated that signing such an application was the quickest way to return to Germany, there were relatively few refusals. Following is the text of these applications:
- "I hereby petition the German Administration of the Interior for appointment in the Volkspolizei, following my release from prisoner of war captivity. I would like this opportunity to assist in the democratic reconstruction of Germany.
- Signature."

- d. The above method of recruitment insured that the so-called Volkspolizei had a base of militarily trained individuals from the beginning. In this connection, it should be pointed out that all members of the Soviet Zone police must be considered "volunteers" from a legal point of view. Rumors about regular drafting of personnel have been heard from time to time; especially lately there has been talk of conscription in the Soviet Zone.

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- e. On the other hand, it is well established that the young men of the Soviet Zone were subjected to extraordinary pressure to make them "volunteer". There are reports of the activities of the so-called recruiting teams, which moved from town to town. If the young men were still unwilling to enlist in the police after listening to the lectures, music, etc., the chief of the team contacted, through the local SED organization, the employers and persuaded the latter to dispense the young, physically able men from their shop or factory. At the Labor Office, the young men were faced with a choice of volunteering for the police or going into the mines. Generally speaking, the most powerful persuasive factor to "volunteer" for the police was the alternative of having to go into the mines.

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- f. There are recurring rumors among the Eastern Zone population that former German officers were to be drafted into the police, to insure the proper military training of the rank and file. This point could not yet be confirmed. The presence of former Free Germany Committee officers in the police is, of course, well known. There has been no evidence, however, to indicate that officers not connected with the Free Germany movement were even accepted, much less drafted, into the Soviet Zone police. From time to time, former German officers appear in Giesseu who claim they fled the Soviet Zone because they were to be drafted into the police. Thorough interrogation, however, always established that the individual in question has only heard the rumor. When subsequently he was called to the Kommandantura or the German police station, he jumped to the conclusion that the rumor was now a fact, and fled the Zone. In a great many cases, individuals who fled the Soviet Zone for economic reasons cite the rumor and try to exploit the situation for personal gain (i.e. to be certified as political refugees).
 - g. The only concrete example of officers other than Free Germany Committee members being accepted into the police is supplied by former Captain Kurt Albrecht, whose last Wehrmacht assignment was as instructor in the Non-Commissioned Officers' School at Eisenach. Albrecht claims to have had an interview in Berlin-Milhelmsruh with Chief Inspector Dollwetz on 30 August 1949 in the course of which he was offered an appointment with rank equivalent to captain in the police. He claims that he was told by Dollwetz that his responsibilities would be purely of a technical, instructing nature and that he would not have anything to do with the political indoctrination aspects of the training. Assuming that the above is true, the Albrecht case is still believed to be the exception rather than the rule since (1) Albrecht is a member of the SED (and thus politically regarded as more reliable than other former officers) and (2) his experience as teacher in an NCO school makes him particularly desirable at the present stage of development. (Comment: Deposition by Kurt Albrecht is available but not included in this summary.)
2. The reliability of the Soviet Zone police.
 - a. The assignment of so-called Polit-Kultur officers at all levels of the Soviet Zone police command indicates the importance which the Soviets attach to proper political indoctrination, which they regard as essential to insure political reliability. The function of the Polit-Kultur officers is similar to that of the political commissars in the Red Army and is also comparable to the role of the National Socialist leadership officers (NS-Führungs-offiziere) in the Hitler Army.
 - b. A number of depositions were obtained according to which the recurring theme of the Polit-Kultur officers, when talking about the necessity of political indoctrination, may be summed up in the following words: "We want to be sure that when one of these days the shooting starts, all the rifles on our side will be pointed in the right direction". These words, if true, indicate that a spirit of distrust prevails and that the authorities entertain small illusions about the reliability of the force under their control. The constant political indoctrination will have a strong effect over a period of years.

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- c. The former chief of the Soviet Zone police communications system, Arthur Z'hme, crossed the border near Coburg on 19 September 1949, and made the following remarks in connection with Soviet suspicions regarding the political reliability of the police: "Although the technical preparations for the police radio network in the Soviet Zone had been completed by the end of 1948, the Karlshorst authorities have repeatedly postponed the granting of permission to commence operations. One of the difficulties was that the Soviets could not bring themselves to work out a code system in conjunction with German technicians, nor were they willing to make a Soviet code available for German use. I have heard repeatedly the highest officials in Wilhelmsruh commenting on the extreme distrust which the Russians show in negotiations (on the radio network)."
- d. It should be remembered, however, that the political unreliability of the majority of its members did not influence the operations of the German army and would have little effect on the operations of the Soviet Zone police. The politically reliable elements, in any dictatorship, are well organized. The great mass of dissidents lack any coordination or leadership; they believe themselves to be only single individuals and seldom dare to speak their true opinion, for fear of retaliatory measures. The (Giesse) Commission views as utopian any hope that the Soviet Zone police would be rendered ineffective by the "guns in the rear echelons". Such hopes are just as unrealistic as those which rely on the possibility of an internal overthrow of a modern police state.

III. Paramilitary (or Alert) Police (Bereitschaften).

1. The strength of paramilitary police units.
- a. As initially organized in the summer of 1948, the Bereitschaft unit consisted of between 250 and 280 men. The Bereitschaft unit was subdivided into 4 platoons of 57 men each; the squads consisted of 18 men each. In addition to the 4 platoons, each Bereitschaft unit had a messenger squad and a staff. The average Bereitschaft consisted of 2 rifle platoons, a machine gun, and a submachine gun platoon. In the first phases the armaments of the Bereitschaft units were restricted to the 98 K carbine (rifle), the 08/15 and/or the 1942 water-cooled machine gun, and various types of pistols and submachine guns.
- b. For the past several months there have been strong rumors to the effect that the strength of paramilitary police units was going to be increased radically. [redacted] the various barracks housing paramilitary police units were being expanded and readied for occupancy by an average of 1,000 men. These early reports were later substantiated, [redacted] the Soviet Zone police agree that the authorized strength for Bereitschaft units is now around 1,000, although it is stated that most Bereitschaften are several platoons under the Table of Organization strength.

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2. The training of the Bereitschaften.
- a. There is general agreement that the training of the paramilitary police is primarily of military nature. [redacted]
Since there are a number of former officers among

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them, and almost all of them had military service in the Wehrmacht, it may be assumed that they know how to recognize military training.

- b. The basic training of the paramilitary police recruits is quite similar to the initial training formerly given to German infantry recruits. In the later stages, the recruit is given instructions in the use of his weapons. This leads to field exercises and battle conditions are simulated by matching two equally strong units against each other, for offensive or defensive type maneuvers, which usually include the use of training grenades. In the schedule these exercises are listed as "Instruction in police tactics", but it cannot be claimed that such exercises are necessary to train the police for the arrest of criminals, dispersal of crowds, etc.
- c. To be sure, the above-mentioned basic training is not restricted to Bereitschaft units, but is given to all members of the police in the course of weekly instruction periods. The intention is obviously to constitute the Bereitschaften as the active military force, while the rest of the police is to be considered as the trained reserve.
- d. In addition to infantry-type training, in recent months paramilitary units have been given courses in combat engineering. For the time being most of these courses are merely theoretical but only because the necessary equipment is not yet available. The combat engineer course consists of the following: establishment and clearance of road-blocks and other obstacles, placement of explosive charges, mine-laying and clearing, and construction and demolition of bridges.
 - e. Several have participated in large-scale field exercises, including the simulated defense of fortified positions.
 - f. Many paramilitary policemen call attention to the registration, within the paramilitary police, of individuals who have had specialized training (such as engineers, tank crews, fliers, artillery experts, etc.) in the Wehrmacht. this registration is a significant indication of the course which the paramilitary force will take in the future.
3. Reports about the issue of heavy weapons to the Bereitschaften.
 - a. There have been many contradictory and inaccurate reports on this subject. Lately, however, there have been rumors, which appear to have a more than usually factual basis, on the impending large-scale increase in the strength and the military effectiveness of the Bereitschaft units. there are preparations going on to establish one or more motorized Bereitschaften. It has been established that in the neighborhood of several Bereitschaft installations preparations have been made for motor pools, grease-racks, gasoline storage tanks, etc. These reports speak for themselves.

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- b. Reports about heavy artillery and tank units in the 50X1-HUM
Bereitschaften could not be confirmed. Several [redacted]
[redacted] claimed to know about the existence of such 50X1-HUM
units, and some appeared to have a wealth of detailed
information, including names of commanding officers,
location of the units, etc. Careful interrogation
established, however, that in all cases there has 50X1-HUM
been only a repetition of rumors, hearsay, and so forth.

c.

- d. With reference to the rumors about the existence of 50X1-HUM
Fliegerbereitschaften (flying units), [redacted] 50X1-HUM
found no evidence of the existence of such units.

4. Rumors of German units in Greece.

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- a. [redacted] no evidence to support the rumors
that German units had been dispatched to fight on the
communist side in the Greek civil war. Whereas all
former Soviet Zone policemen had heard this rumor,
not a single one could be found [redacted] 50X1-HUM
who could offer the least bit of concrete evidence
on the subject.

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